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Abstract
This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack
and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the
defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately
or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has
a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing
assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our experimental results indicate that
the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in the
overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender engages in the contest
significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties exceed
predicted levels. Moreover, both defenders and attackers actually increase the intensity of the
fight as they approach the end of the contest.
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1. Introduction
Environments, such as cyber-security (Moore et al., 2009), pipeline systems (Hirshleifer,
1983), complex production processes (Kremer, 1993), and anti-terrorism defense (Sandler and
Enders, 2004) can be characterized as weakest-link systems. In each of these cases an attacker
only needs to disrupt one component of the system to create a total failure. Defenders are forced
to constantly protect the entire system while attackers are encouraged to seek the weakest point.
Recently, a number of theoretical papers emerged trying to model the optimal strategies
of those who wish to protect weakest-link systems and those who wish to destroy them. Most of
the theoretical work has been focused on the case where the attacker and the defender
simultaneously decide how much to invest in each potential target, known as the Colonel Blotto
game.1 For example, Clark and Konrad (2007) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010) both provide
a theoretical analysis of a multi-battle two-player game where the attacker and the defender
simultaneously commit resources to multiple battles in order to win a prize.2 To receive the
prize, the attacker needs to win at least one battle while the defender must win all battles.
Another class of attack and defense games, distinct from the simultaneous multi-battle game,
assumes that battles proceed sequentially. Most of such models originated with the seminal
R&D paper of Fudenberg et al. (1983).3 The theoretical model studied in our paper, however, is
most closely related to Levitin and Hausken (2010), who consider a contest in which a defender
seeks to protect a network and an attacker seeks to destroy it through multiple sequential

1

For a review of the literature see Roberson (2006). Some examples of simultaneous games of attack and defense
are Gross (1950), Cooper and Restrepo (1967), Shubik and Weber (1981), Snyder (1989), Coughlin (1992), Szentes
and Rosenthal (2003), Bier et al. (2007), Kvasov (2007), and Hart (2008).
2
The main distinction between the two papers is that Clark and Konrad (2007) assume the probability of winning a
given battle is proportional to investment while Kovenock and Roberson (2010) assume that victory is deterministic.
3
The subsequent papers of Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987), Leininger (1991), Budd et al. (1993), and Konrad and
Kovenock (2009) investigate different factors that affect behavior in the sequential multi-battle contests.
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attacks.4 Levitin and Hausken (2010) model the probability of winning a given battle with a
lottery contest success function.

Due to complexity of their model, most of the paper’s

theoretical results are based on numerical simulations. 5 The current paper explores both
theoretically and through controlled laboratory experiments a game of sequential attacks in a
weakest-link network using an all pay-auction framework.
Sequential attacks in a weakest-link network can be viewed as a “game of siege” where
the defender attempts to hold an asset such as a fort (or mission such as the Alamo) or landing
strip (such as the Berlin blockade after WWII) against repeated assault. Arguably, the most
famous siege, whether it is true or not, was the battle of Troy in which the Greeks finally ended a
prolonged siege by hiding in a wooden horse according to Greek mythology. Less militaristic
examples include a university that must continually prevent its best faculty from being poached
by another school or a person who is trying to prevent their spouse from being wooed away. In
this type of game, the attacker and defender decide how much to invest in each battle after
learning the outcome of any previous battle. The side making the larger investment wins that
battle, with ties being broken randomly, creating a series of all-pay auctions. The attacker only
needs to be successful once, while the defender must repel each successive assault to win, and
hence the game has a weakest-link structure.

Our theoretical model predicts that if the

defender’s valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then the
defender has a constant incentive to fight in each battle and otherwise he folds immediately.
Thus, defenders exhibit a response pattern of fight or flight. Attackers respond to defense with
diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our experimental results
4

Similar problems have been studied in the “shoot-look-shoot problem” literature (for a review see Glazebrook and
Washburn, 2004). However, those models assume that the probability of winning a battle does not depend on the
defender’s and the attacker’s efforts.
5
Kovenock and Roberson (2010) point out that the pure strategy equilibrium may not always exist in the model of
Levitin and Hausken (2010).
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indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defender’s valuation and it
decreases in the overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender engages in the
contest significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties
exceed predicted levels. Also, contrary to theoretical predictions, both the defender and attacker
actually increase the intensity of the fight as they approach the known end of the game.
Indentifying the predictive success of the models, such as the one described in the current
study, is of obvious social value. However, the usual concerns about unobservable information
are present with studies of naturally occurring data and conducting field tests could be extremely
costly in this context, making laboratory experiments an ideal tool for empirical validation. Our
study adds to the experimental literature on multi-battle contests. To date there are only a few
experimental studies that investigate games of multiple contests. Avrahami and Kareev (2009)
and Chowdhury et al. (2009) test several basic predictions of the original Colonel Blotto game
and find support for the major theoretical predictions. Kovenock et al. (2010) study a multibattle contest with asymmetric objectives and find support for the theoretical model of Kovenock
and Roberson (2010) but not Clark and Konrad (2007). Our study contributes to this literature
by investigating the behavior in the “game of siege.”

2. The Game of Siege
Before introducing the general model of sequential attack and defense (or “game of
siege”), it is useful to review the simple one shot contest, or all-pay auction, between two
asymmetric players as in Baye et al. (1996). Assume that two risk-neutral players compete for a
prize in a contest. The prize valuation for player 1 is
Both players expend resources

and

and for player 2 it is

, where

.

, and the player with the highest expenditures wins. In

4

case of a tie, the winner is selected randomly. Irrespective of who wins the contest, both players
forfeit their expenditures. It is well known that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in such a
game (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996). The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is
characterized by the following proposition due to Baye et al (1996).
Proposition 1. In the mixed strategy equilibrium of a contest between two asymmetric
:

players, with valuations

(i) Players randomize over the interval
functions

∗

and

∗

∈ 0,

, according to cumulative distribution

1

for .

(ii) Player 1’s expected expenditure is

and player 2’s is

.
0.

and player 2’s is

(iii) Player 1’s expected payoff is
1

(iv) Player 1’s probability of winning is

and player 2’s is

.

We now turn to the case of two players, attacker and defender, competing in multiple
sequential contests. The objective of the attacker
receives a valuation of

is to win a single battle, in which case he

. The objective of the defender

he receives a valuation of

, where

is to win all

battles, in which case

. As the battles occur sequentially, both players

first simultaneously allocate their respective resources

and

in battle 1. If

, then the

contest stops and the attacker receives

. However, if the defender is successful in battle 1, the

contest proceeds to battle 2. Again, if

, then the contest stops and the attackers receives

. This process repeats until either the attacker wins one battle or the defender wins all
battles. The net payoff of player

is equal to the value of the prize if he wins minus the

expenditures spent during the competition in each battle up to that point, i.e.
where l is battle won by the attacker. If player

5

∑

,

is never successful this payoff (loss) is the

∑

negative sum of his expenditures, i.e.
∑

if player

. The payoff to player
∑

wins all the battles and

is similar, i.e.

if he loses battle l.

To analyze this game we apply backward induction. Consider the contest in battle . In
the last battle, the value of winning the contest for player
, with

is

and the value for player

. Therefore, this is a simple one-stage contest between two asymmetric players

as characterized by Proposition 1. In such a contest, the expected expenditure of player
battle

is

and the expenditures of player

is

Proposition 1, the expected payoff of player
payoff of player

in battle

is

in

. According to

is

and the expected

0.

is

Next, we consider the contest in the penultimate battle. The defender’s continuation
value of winning battle

1 is

, his expected payoff from competing in battle , and his

value of losing is 0, since the contest stops if the attacker wins even a single battle. On the other
hand, the value to the attacker of winning battle

1 is

, since the attacker only needs a

single victory, and the value to the attacker of losing is 0, the expected payoff from competing in
battle . Given, these expected payoffs, the contest in battle

1 is again a simple single stage

contest between two asymmetric players as characterized by Proposition 1. However, this time
the continuation valuate of player

is

and the value of player

is

. If the defender’s

continuation value is sufficiently higher than the attackers value, i.e.
defender has the advantage and his expected payoff in battle

, then the

1 is

2

, while the

attacker’s expected payoff is 0.
Similar exercises can be performed for battles

2, …,

, …, 2, and 1. Table 1

reports the expected expenditures and payoffs in each battle. Note that in generating Table 1, we
assume that

, i.e. the defender’s valuation is sufficiently high relative to the number of
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battles
and

. In such a case, the defender always randomizes between 0

and attacker’s valuation

and the expected expenditure of the defender in each battle

is

. On

is decreasing in

the other hand, the expenditure of the attacker

,

which means that the attacker’s aggression decreases in number of battles won by the defender.6
We summarize these findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If

, then in each battle, player

allocation from the support 0,
. Player

is

, according to the cumulative distribution function
1

utilizes the distribution

expenditure in battle

randomly draws resource

of player

in battle

is

. The expected

and the expected expenditure of player

.
Proposition 2 is based on the assumption that the defender has a relatively high

valuation.7 However, if the number of battles

is sufficiently high or player ’s valuation

is

sufficiently small, then the defender may give up, by expending 0 resources in the first battle.8
To demonstrate this, assume that in battle 2 the continuation value of the defender
2

is not enough to cover the current valuation of the attacker

, i.e.

2

. In

such a case, the attacker has an advantage in battle 2 over the defender. According to Proposition
6

This is mainly because the defender’s valuation of the overall contest in early battles is relatively low, since the
defender has to be successful in each battle and there are still many battles to go. However, as the defender wins
early battles, his valuation for continuing the contest increases and thus the attacker becomes discouraged. As a
result, the probability of winning future battles by the attacker decreases, while the probability of winning future
battles by the defender increases.
7
It is interesting to compare our results to the simultaneous game of attack and defense by Kovenock and Roberson
, the expected payoffs of the attacker and the defender are exactly the same
(2010). In particular, when
under sequential and simultaneous structures. Nevertheless, the strategic behavior in two games is quite different. In
particular, Kovenock and Roberson (2010) find that the attacker utilizes a stochastic guerilla warfare strategy in
which, with probability one, the attacker engages in only one single battle. On the contrary, in our model, the
attacker always has an incentive to fight in each battle.
8
Konrad and Kovenock (2009) call such a break point a ‘separating state.’ Their theoretical model of a contest with
intermediate prizes is more general that the model studies in the current paper. In fact, some of the results provided
in our paper can also be found in Konrad and Kovenock (2009).

7

1, the expected payoff to the attacker is

1

, which is positive, and the expected

value to the defender is 0. Therefore, when making a decision in battle 1, the defender is
expecting to receive 0 payoff in battle 2. Obviously, in such a case, the defender should make no
expenditures as his prize valuation is zero.9 On the other hand the attacker’s valuation of winning
. Therefore, the attacker should make an expenditure of > 0 to guarantee the victory.10

is still

We summarize these results in Table 2 and in the following proposition:
1

Proposition 3. If
while player

, then in battle 1, player

makes an expenditure of 0,

makes an expenditure of . The expected payoff of player

payoff of player

is

is 0 and the expected

.

The final case which is covered neither by Proposition 2 nor by Proposition 3 is when
1

. As shown in Table 3, in this special case, the disadvantaged defender in

battle 1 receives expected payoff of zero. The attacker, on the other hand, receives positive
expected payoff of

. Although the defender does not entirely give up in this case, his

expected expenditures in battle 1 are lower than the expenditures of the attacker. Should the
defender win this initial battle, he would have the advantageous position in battle 2 and all
subsequent battles and the game would progress as in Proposition 2 after relabeling battle 2 as
battle 1.
To summarize, the main prediction of our model is that the attacker always engages in
each battle. The defender engages in the battle only if
of battles

is sufficiently high or the defender’s valuation

9

1

. However, if the number

is sufficiently small, i.e.

Note that this is never the case in the simultaneous game of attack and defense by Kovenock and Roberson (2010).
In particular, under all parameters, the optimal strategy for the defender is to stochastically fight with positive
probability in all battles, allocating random, but positive, resource levels in each battle. On the contrary, in our
1 , the defender gives up with probability one, by allocating zero resources in the first
model, when
battle.
10
To avoid the ε-equilibrium arguments one can also use a rule that favors the player with the highest continuation
valuation (Roberson, 2006). Both rules produce the same equilibrium predictions.
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1

, then the defender gives up with probability one, by expending zero resources in the

first battle. Stated another way, for a given set of values

if the horizon is sufficiently

short then the defender will fight while the attacks grow weaker, but if the horizon is long the
defender will simply give up. The number of battles the defender is willing to endure is
determined by the relative size of

and

, with the defender’s endurance increasing in

.

3. Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experimental design employs three treatments, by manipulating the number of battles
and the valuation of the defender. In all treatments, the valuation of the attacker is kept constant
at

50 experimental francs. In the baseline treatment N3-V150, the number of battles is
150 francs. The subgame perfect equilibrium

3 and the defender’s valuation is

prediction for this treatment is that the defender engages in the competition with the attacker, and
the defender wins the contest with probability 0.31, the joint probability of winning all three
battles.
The other two treatments are designed to increase the attacker’s advantage. In treatment
N4-V150, the number of battles is increased to

4. The defender should not be willing to

fight four battles and thus should invest 0 in battle 1 and concede the contest. Should this not
occur, and the defender actually wins the first battle 1, then behavior in battle 1
should be identical to behavior in battle

in N3-V150 for

in N4-V150

∈ 1,2,3 . Obviously, in the

subgame perfect equilibrium the defender’s joint probability of winning all three battles is 0.
The third treatment is N3-V100, which is similar to the baseline N3-V150 except that the
defender’s value is reduced from

150 to

100 francs. This has the effect of reducing

the continuation value of the defender in every battle just as if extra battles had been inserted into

9

the contest. With these values, defenders should be unwilling to engage in three battles and give
up in battle 1, but would have the upper hand and fight should the contest reach battle 2. Our
choice of a 50 franc reduction was so that the strategic situation was the same in battle
V100 as in battle

1 in N3-V150, when it exists, and battle

in N3-

in N4-150. The predicted

average investment, expected payoff, and probability of winning the contest are reported in
Table 4 for all three treatments.
The experiment was conducted at the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University.
The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Six sessions
each involving 16 undergraduates were run, for a total of 96 unique participants. Some students
had participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research.
Each experimental session involved 20 contests in one of the three treatments, thus we
have a between subjects design. This was done to give the subjects maximum experience with a
set of parameters during the sixty minute session given then sophisticated backwards induction
required to solve this game. Before the first contest in each session subjects were randomly and
anonymously assigned as attacker or defender, which we called participant 1 and participant 2.11
All subjects remained in the same role assignment for the first 10 contests and then changed their
assignment for the last 10 contests. Subjects of opposite assignments were randomly and
anonymously re-paired each contest to form a new two-player group. In each contest, subjects
were asked to choose how many francs to allocate in a given battle, which we called a round.
Subjects were not allowed to allocate more than the value of the reward in any battle and were
informed that regardless of who won the contest, both participants would have to pay their

11

The experimental instructions used context neutral language. The instructions are available in Appendix I.
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allocations. 12 At the end of each battle, the computer displayed one’s own allocation, one’s
opponent’s allocation, and the winner of that battle. The contest ended when the attacker won
one battle or the defender won all the battles.
At the end of the experiment, 2 out of the first 10 contests and 2 out of the last 10
contests were randomly selected for payment. The sum of the earnings for these 4 contests was
exchanged at rate of 25 francs = $1. Due to institutional constraints, actual losses cannot be
extracted from subjects. This creates the potential for loss of experimental control as a subject is
indifferent between small and large losses. We follow the standard procedure of endowing
subjects with money from which losses can be deducted, in this case $20.13 Subjects were paid
privately in cash and the earnings varied from $13.25 to $27.5.

4. Results
4.1. Treatment Effects
Table 4 provides the aggregate results of the experiment. We start our analysis with the
general description of treatment effects. The model predicts the probability of the defender
winning the contest decreases with the defender’s value. Under the parameters used in our
experiment, the equilibrium probability the defender wins the contest is 0.31 in the N3-V150
treatment and it is 0 in the N3-V100 treatment. The observed probabilities in the experiment are
0.41 and 0.29, respectively.

Although the observed probabilities are inconsistent with the

theoretical point predictions, qualitatively they comply with comparative statics predictions.
12

Placing a theoretically nonbinding upper limit on bids may have some psychological impact on behavior
(Sheremeta, 2010a); however concerns regarding the potential loss of control due to bankruptcy (as described at the
end of this section) were considered to be more important.
13
By randomly selecting periods for payment, the size of the endowment is smaller than it would be if subjects were
paid for each contest. Given the restriction that bids could not exceed value in any round and the other features of
the experimental design it was not possible for subjects to go bankrupt.
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Specifically, consistent with theoretical predictions, the probability of successful defense is
higher in the N3-V150 treatment than in the N3-V100 treatment. This difference is significant
based on the estimation of a random effect probit model where the dependent variable is the
defender winning the contest and the independent variables are a period trend and a treatment
dummy-variable (p-value < 0.05).14
Result 1: Consistent with theoretical predictions, the probability of successful defense
increases in the defender’s valuation.
The theory also predicts the probability of the defender winning the contest decreases in
the number of battles. The equilibrium probability of the defender winning the contest is 0.31 in
the N3-V150 treatment and it is 0 in the N4-V150 treatment. The observed probabilities in the
experiment were 0.41 and 0.27, respectively. Again, despite off theoretical point predictions,
qualitatively, this difference is in the predicted direction and significant based on the estimation
of a random effect probit model similar to the one described above (p-value < 0.05).
Result 2: Consistent with theoretical predictions, the probability of successful defense
decreases in the number of battles.

4.2. Within Treatment Behavior
Although the qualitative predictions of the theory are supported by the data, the
quantitative predictions are clearly rejected. One notable feature of the data is the considerable
over-expenditure in all treatments. This can be seen from the fact that both the attacker and the

14

We used two different variables for a period trend, one for the first 10 periods and one for the last 10 periods of
the experiment. The two variables were used since subjects changed their role assignments after the first 10 periods
of the experiment.

12

defender earn significantly lower payoffs than predicted.15 Such significant over-expenditure is
not uncommon in experimental literature on contests and all-pay auctions (Davis and Reilly,
1998; Potters et al., 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Lugovskyy, et al., 2010; Sheremeta,
2010a, 2010b). Still, we rarely observe defenders spending more in the contest (over all three
rounds) than the value of winning. In fact, such over-dissipation by defenders only occurs in 1%
of the contests in N3-V150 and N3-V100 and 4% of the contests in N4-V150. For attackers the
rate is higher, although still not large at 4% in N3-V100 and 15% in N3-V150 and N4-V150.
This difference in attackers and defenders is unsurprising given that the value of winning is
much higher for defenders.
Result 3: Contrary to theoretical predictions, there is considerable aggregate overexpenditure in all treatments by both attackers and defenders.
One explanation for the over-expenditure is that subjects fall prey to a sunk cost fallacy.
For the payoff maximization problem, expenditures in previous battles are sunk costs and should
be ignored, but evidence from various behavioral studies suggests people incorporate sunk costs
in their decision-making (Friedman et al. 2007).16 Several other possible explanations, proposed
in the literature, include subjects having a non-monetary value of winning (Goeree et al., 2002;
Sheremeta, 2010b), having spiteful preferences (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008) or making mistakes
(Potters et al., 1998; Goeree et al., 2002; Sheremeta, 2010a).
15

A standard Wald test, conducted on estimates of panel regression models, rejects the hypothesis that the average
payoffs in N3-V100, N3-V150, and N4-V150 treatments are equal to the predicted theoretical values in Table 4 (pvalues < 0.05). The panel regression models included a random effects error structure, with a random effect for each
individual subject, to account for the repeated measures nature of the data. The standard errors were clustered at the
session level to account for session effects. The two separate period trends were used to control for learning for the
first 10 periods and the last 10 periods of the experiment.
16
In our experiment, subjects who get to the last battle have already made some expenditures in the previous battles.
If the sunk cost hypothesis is true, it will entail that subjects who expend more in previous battles are also more
likely to expend more in the last battle – to recoup some of their expenditure. A simple random effect model finds
that for the defender there is a positive relationship between expenditure in battle 3 and total expenditure in the
previous battles 1 and 2 (p-value < 0.05). However, for the attacker such correlation is negative (p-value < 0.05).
Therefore, we conclude that the sunk cost fallacy is not likely to be the main consistent force driving the overexpenditures in our experiment.
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Camerer (2003) argues that subjects can learn to play equilibrium strategies with
experience. Figure 1 shows the total expenditure (sum of expenditures in all battles) over time.
There is no clear trend in any of the three treatments, indicating that on aggregate subjects
consistently employ similar strategies across all periods of the experiment. A regression of the
total expenditure on a time trend, estimated separately for each treatment, shows that there is no
significant relationship between the two variables (p-values > 0.10). Separating the data by
player type and battle, we again find no consistent patterns (see Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c).17
Another readily apparent feature of the data is that defenders do not surrender in the first
battle in N3-V100 or N4-V150, see Table 3. While the average investment is lower in these two
periods than in the subsequent periods, it is not 0. In fact, defenders spend 0 in less than 5% of
the battles in which they are predicted to do so. 18 Defenders’ behavior is counteracted by
attackers who invest more than the minimal amount predicted in equilibrium. A simple random
effect model, estimated separately for each treatment, finds that the average bid in the first battle
is significantly higher than 0 for both the attacker and the defender (p-values < 0.05).
Result 4: Contrary to theoretical predictions, the defenders do not give up and the
attackers expend substantial resources in the first battle.
In all other battles the expected expenditure by defenders should be the same. However,
defenders are actually increasing their defenses as the end of the contest approaches. Attackers
also increase the intensity of their assault as the end of the contest approaches, the exact opposite
of the pattern predicted by the theory. These trends are statistically significant based on the

17

Of course, it may be that changes to behavior due to learning require more experience than provided in our
experiment.
18
A reluctance to bid 0 could be due to the active participation hypothesis (see Lei, Noussair, and Plott 2001), which
argues that subjects who come to laboratory experiments want to do something.
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estimation of the panel regression models.19 Moreover, as indicated by Figures 2a, 2b and 2c,
such patterns persist throughout all 20 periods of the experiment.
Result 5: Contrary to theoretical predictions, both defenders and attackers increase the
intensity of the fight as they approach the end of the contest.
Results 4 and 5 are clearly inconsistent with the theoretical predictions, which are largely
based on a well-known phenomena in the all-pay auction literature – a “discouragement
effect.”20 In particular, the defender should be discouraged in the first battle in treatments N3V100 and N4-V150 because his relative valuation is so much lower than the valuation of the
attacker. This discouragement effect also causes the attacker’s aggression to decrease in the
number of battles won by the defender.21 Although our results are clearly inconsistent with these
predictions, we do find some support for a discouragement effect. In particular, consistent with
the theoretical predictions, we find the probability of the attacker winning each consecutive
battle decreases, while the probability of the defender wining increases (p-values < 0.05).22
Result 6: Consistent with theoretical predictions, with each successful defense, the
probability of the defender winning the next battle increases, while for the attacker it decreases.

19

We estimate a panel regression model separately for each treatment and player type. Each model included random
effects for each individual subject and standard errors were clustered at the session level. The two separate period
trends were used to control for learning for the first 10 periods and the last 10 periods of the experiment. The
independent variable is bid and the main dependent variable is the battle number. For the defender, the battle
number variable is positive and significant in all treatments (p-values < 0.05). For the attacker, the battle number
variable is positive and significant in treatments N3-V100 and N4-V150 (p-values < 0.05), but not in treatment N3V150.
20
Theoretically, this discouragement effect is the driving force behind the predictions of our model (Baye et al.,
1996). The idea behind the discouragement effect is straightforward: the player with the higher valuation imposes a
strong discouragement effect on the player with the lower valuation. As the result, the player with the lower
valuation reduces his expenditures.
21
The defender’s valuation for continuing the contest increases in the number of battles won and thus the attacker
becomes discouraged.
22
We estimate a probit panel regression model separately for each treatment, using subject random effects and two
period trends. The independent variable is an indicator whether the defender won the battle and the main dependent
variable is the battle number. The battle number variable is positive and significant in all treatments (p-values <
0.05). Obviously, the probability of the attacker winning each battle is simply one minus the probability of winning
that battle by the defender. So, the same statistical conclusions carry on to the attackers.
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4.3. Guerillas In Our Midst
While it is clear that subjects are not behaving in strict accordance with the theoretical
predictions, is there some consistency to how they behave? For attackers, there is anecdotal
evidence to suggest that many people are behaving like guerillas, focusing their investments on
one intense attack. Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c plot the largest and second largest attacks for every
contest lasting at least three battles for each treatment.23 Nearly half of these contests are such
that the largest attack is at least 10 times greater than the next largest attack.24 For comparison,
the ratio of the largest defense to the second largest defense is less than 2 for more than 90% of
these same contests. Kovenock et al. (2010) also report behavior consistent with guerilla attacks
in the simultaneous weakest-link contest. Together these results may suggest such behavior is a
robust strategy when attacking weakest-link systems.

5. Conclusions
Numerous systems in society can be described as weakest-link networks, where a single
breach can destroy the entire system. For example, in preventing airplane hijackings, passenger
screening inside the terminal at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is only valuable if a
terrorist cannot freely walk up to planes on the tarmac at Northwest Arkansas Regional Airport
(XNA). Recently, attention has been given to modeling the optimal strategies of those who wish
to protect weakest-link systems and those who wish to destroy them. However, that work has
23

Any contest that ends after the first battle is trivially consistent with a guerilla attack. Also, any attacker
following the equilibrium strategy in N3-V100 or N4-V150 and winning the second battle would appear to be a
guerrilla based upon the metric used in Figures 3b and 3c. Therefore the figures only include contests that lasted at
least 3 battles, although they are qualitatively unchanged if contests lasting for only two battles are included.
24
For defenders, individual behavior is similar to the aggregate pattern discussed above where defense tends to
increase with each successive battle.
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been focused on the case where the attacker is deciding among targets and the defender has to
protect all potential targets concurrently. In this paper we consider the case where battles occur
sequentially, a game of siege. For example, an employer has to retain its skilled employees
every period and it is not enough for the army to prevent the overthrow of the government once.
In our model, a battle is won by the party investing more, but the defender has to win the
entire series of battles to win the contest while the attacker needs to win only once. Within this
structure, the continuation value of the defender is increasing within each battle won as the
number of future battles that must be won is decreasing. If the horizon is too long, the defender
should optimally choose to concede in the first battle. If the horizon is sufficiently short, then
the defender will put up a fight in every battle, but the intensity of the defense should not change
as the end approaches. Thus, the decision of defenders when they first come under assault is one
of fight or flight. Somewhat counter intuitively, when facing a fight the intensity of the assault
should decrease over time.

These predictions are dramatically different from the existing

literature on simultaneous battle contest where attackers concentrate on a single target and
defenders are forced to randomize their protection of each target.
This study also reports the results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to test
the theoretical predictions of our model. In our baseline treatment, defenders should fight. Our
two alternative treatments have either more battles or a lower payoff to the defender for winning,
both of which should cause defender to prefer flight. What we actually observe is that subjects
in both roles tend to over invest, driving profits down. Further, defenders are reluctant to fold
when they should and tend to actually increase their effort as the contest progresses. Attackers
also increase their investments as the contest progresses, contrary to the theoretical predictions.
While the observed behavior is not consistent with the theoretical predictions, it may be
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consistent with some form of a gamblers fallacy or spitefulness, both of which are commonly
observed in the lab. It also appears that attackers engage in concentrated assaults suggesting that
the guerilla behavior reported by Kovenock et al. (2010) is a robust phenomenon when people
are attacking weakest-link systems. We believe that the connection between behavior and theory
is an important area for future research.
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Appen
ndix I: In
nstruction
ns for N3
3-V100
General In
nstructions
This is an experiment in the economicss of decision making.
m
Variouus research agencies have prrovided the funnds for
this researcch. The instru
uctions are simp
ple and if you follow them cllosely and makke careful deciisions, you cann make
an appreciaable amount off money.
The curren
ncy used in thee experiments is
i called Franccs. At the end of the experim
ment your Franncs will be connverted
to US Dollars at the ratee 25 Franks = US $1. You
u are being givven a $20 partiicipation paym
ment. Any gainns you
make will be added to th
his amount, wh
hile any losses will be deductted from it. Yoou will be paidd privately in ccash at
the end of the experimentt.
It is very important thatt you do not communicate with others oor look at theiir computer sccreens. If youu have
questions, or need assistaance of any kin
nd, please raisee your hand andd an experimennter will approoach you. If yoou talk
or make otther noises duriing the experim
ment you will be
b asked to leav
ave and you willl not be paid.
periment
Instructions for the Exp
The experiiment consists of 20 decision
n tasks. At thee beginning off the first task yyou will be ranndomly assignned the
role of parrticipant 1 or participant 2. You will rem
main in this rolle for the first 10 decision taasks and then cchange
your role assignment
a
for the last 10 task
ks of the experriment. For eacch task you wiill be randomlyy paired with aanother
participantt in the experim
ment who is in
n the opposite role. There arre 16 particip
pants in the exxperiment so 8 are in
each role. For each task
k you are equallly likely to bee paired with aany of the 8 paarticipants in thhe other role, bbut no
participantt will be able to
o identify if or when he or shee has been pairred with a speccific person.
The Decisiion Task
For each decision
d
task th
here is a reward in Francs forr participant 1 and a reward in Francs for pparticipant 2. These
rewards arre not the samee for the two participants.
p
Only
O
one of thee participants w
will receive the reward for a given
task. The reward
r
to partticipant 1 is 10
00 Francs and the reward to p
participant 2 is 50 Francs.
Each task involves up to
o 3 rounds. In
n each round, both participaants allocate Frrancs, and whooever allocatess more
Francs win
ns that round with
w ties being broken random
mly. A particippant’s allocatioon cannot exceeed his or her rreward
so allocations can be an
nything from [0
0, 0.1, 0.2, …, the reward]. So for exam
mple, if particippant 1 allocatees 11.4
Francs and
d participant 2 allocates
a
11.3 francs,
f
then paarticipant 1 willl win the roundd.
To enter your
y
allocation,, you simply ty
ype it in the bo
ox on your scrreen and press OK. After booth participantts have
done this, each
e
person wiill be informed
d of both allocaations and whoo won the roundd.
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Your Earn
nings
If participaant 1 wins all 3 rounds then he
h or she receiives the rewardd. However, iff participant 2 w
wins any roundd, then
participantt 2 receives the reward. Sin
nce participantt 2 only needs to win a singgle round, the task will end if this
occurs. No
otice that a sing
gle reward is reeceived for thee whole task; thhere is not a reeward for each round.
Any Franccs allocated in a round are ded
ducted from yo
our payment reegardless of whhether or not yyou won the rouund or
the reward
d. This means that if both participants allo
ocate Francs inn a task, then oone will lose F
Francs. This iis why
each particcipant is being given a particiipation paymen
nt of $20, whicch corresponds to 500 Francs.
Consider th
he following example
e
wheree the reward to
o participant 1 is 100 and thee reward to paarticipant 2 is 550 and
the task in
nvolves 3 poten
ntial rounds. If participant 1 allocates 15 Francs in rouund 1 and partticipant 2 alloccates 5
Francs in round
r
1 then participant
p
1 wins
w
the round
d and both partticipants lose ttheir allocationns. If in the ssecond
round participant 1 alloccates 10 Francss and participaant 2 allocates 15 Francs thenn participant 2 wins the rounnd and
hence receeives the reward. Participant 1’s earnings for
fo the task wouuld be –15 – 10 = –25 Franccs and Participaant 2’s
earnings fo
or the task wou
uld be 50 – 5 – 15 = 30 Francs.

After each task, you will be shown you
ur payoff (posittive or negativve) in francs for that task. Yoou should recoord this
n on your Perssonal Record Sheet.
S
At the conclusion of the experimennt, 2 out of thee first 10 tasks and 2
information
out of the last 10 tasks will
w be randomlly selected. Your
Y
experimenntal earnings w
will be the sum
m of your earninngs on
those four tasks. This am
mount will be added
a
to your participation
p
paayment.
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Appendix II: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Equilibrium Payoffs and Expenditures for
Battle

Expected Payoff
Player
Player

1
2

1

…

…
1

…

Probability of Winning
Player

2

2

1

0

2
…

2

2

0

…

Expected Bid
Player

Player

0

…

…

.

1
1

2

1

2

2

…

2
…

2

…
1

2

…

2

3

0

2

2

1

2

0

2

2

0
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…
1

2

1

2

2

2
1
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Table 2: Equilibrium Payoffs and Expenditures for
Battle
1
2

Expected Payoff
Player
Player
0

3
…

2
…

Expected Bid
Player

Player
0
2

1

0

…
0

Probability of Winning
Player
0
2

2
0

.

2

2

2
…

2

3

1

2
2

2

…
1

2

1

Expected Payoff
Player
Player
0

2
…

1
…

0
…
0

Expected Bid
Player
Player
1
1
2
2
2
…
2
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Table 3: Equilibrium Payoffs and Expenditures for
Battle
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2

Probability of Winning
Player
2
1

1
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Table 4: Equilibrium Predictions and Aggregate Statistics
Treatment
( , , )

N3-V100
(3, 100, 50)
N3-V150
(3, 150, 50)
N4-V150
(4, 150, 50)

Battle
Number
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

Average Allocation
Equil
D
A
0.0
0.1
25.0 25.0
25.0 12.5
25.0 25.0
25.0 12.5
25.0
8.3
0.0
0.1
25.0 25.0
25.0 12.5
25.0
8.3

Actual
D
A
15.0 12.4
20.1 11.1
26.7 14.6
26.8 18.0
32.6 13.0
39.2 17.0
18.4 13.1
22.5 12.0
28.6 15.2
34.8 16.8

Expected Payoff
Equil
D A

Actual
D
A

0

50

-7.5

11.6

0

0

-6.7

-6.0

0

50

-17.4

3.2
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Probability of
Winning a Battle
Equil
Actual
D
D
0.00
0.55
0.50
0.70
0.75
0.75
0.50
0.65
0.75
0.79
0.83
0.80
0.00
0.63
0.50
0.74
0.75
0.73
0.83
0.79

Probability of
Winning the Game
Equil
Actual
D
D
0.00

0.29

0.31

0.41

0.00

0.27

Figure 1: Total Expenditure across All Periods (All Treatments)
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Figure 2a: Expenditures in Each Battle across All Periods (N3-V100 Treatment)
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Figure 2b: Expenditures in Each Battle across All Periods (N3-V150 Treatment)
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Figure 2c: Expenditures in Each Battle across All Periods (N4-V150 Treatment)
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Figure 3a: Attacks Lasting for at least Two Battles in (N3-V100 Treatment)
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Figure 3a: Attacks Lasting for at least Two Battles in (N3-V150 Treatment)
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Figure 3c: Attacks Lasting for at least Two Battles in (N4 -V100 Treatment)
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